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In flow models of the labor market, wages are determined by negotiations between workers
and employers on the surplus value of a realized match. From this perspective, this paper
presents an econometric analysis of the influence of labor market flows on wage formation
as an alternative to the traditional specification of wage equations in which unemployment
represents Phillips-curve or wage-curve effects. The paper estimates a dynamic wage
equation for the Netherlands using a cointegration approach. It finds that labor flows, and
notably flows from outside the labor market, are important determinants of both short-run
and long-run wage setting.
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I. Introduction
Modern empirical studies of the labor market pay ample attention to labor
market dynamics. Besides job destruction, job creation, and job-to-job mobility,
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wage formation forms a cornerstone of these studies (Blanchard and Diamond
1992 and Mortensen and Pissarides 1994). The theoretical basis is the equilibrium
search model, in which wage formation is described as a Nash bargaining problem
of sharing the local monopoly rent of a successful match between an employer and
an employee (see for example Pissarides 1996). In this paper we apply this theory
to derive an empirical wage equation. Specifically, we specify a wage equation for
the Netherlands that is derived from a Nash bargaining process in a flow model
with three labor market states: employed, unemployed, and outside the labor market.
The outcome of the bargaining process yields a specification of the wage equation
with various flows between these labor market states as determinants.
Our specification of the wage equation extends the traditional specifications of
the wage equation, which includes some measure of unemployment as a determinant
of wages. Nowadays Phillips’s (1958) empirical relationship between the rate of
change of wages and unemployment has a number of alternative theoretical
foundations. Phelps (1968) has shown how the Phillips-curve effect can be derived
from the behavior of the firm. In a newer tradition, trade union behavior has been
shown to imply a relationship between the level of wages and unemployment: the
so-called wage-curve (Oswald 1982, Blanchflower and Oswald 1990, and Graafland
1992). However, neither of these theoretical derivations of the wage equation
prescribes that the unemployment rate or some transformation thereof should act
as a measure for labor market tightness. Instead, the theory allows for a much
wider set of indicators. In this respect, Blanchard and Katz (1997) point at the
importance of labor market flows for wage setting, although their empirical estimates
consider only the relationship between unemployment and wages. Broersma and
Den Butter (2001, 2002) estimate specifications of wage equations where various
labor-flow variables that represent labor market tightness are included on an ad
hoc basis. This paper builds on these previous studies. From a formal theoretical
model, we derive a specification of a flow-based wage equation, which is estimated
using the cointegration approach. In our estimates, we use aggregate time-series
data on these labor flows for the Netherlands, constructed according to a recently
developed national accounting method (Broersma, Den Butter, and Kock 2000,
and Kock 2002).
In the next section, the theoretical specification of the flow-based wage equation
is presented. It is also shown how our specification relates to traditional empirical
studies of the labor market. Section III describes the flow data that we use and
presents our cointegration estimates of the wage equation. Section IV concludes. SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM WAGE FORMATION 237
II. Wages as a shared surplus of matches in the labor market
In recent years much research has been done on the empirical application of
equilibrium search models. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) have used panel data
to estimate a structural equilibrium search model. Others have calibrated an
equilibrium search model to explain unemployment dynamics, such as Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998). This paper focuses on a particular aspect of empirical search
models, namely wage formation. Equilibrium search theory, which is the theoretical
background of empirical search models of the labor market, provides an adequate
framework for the inclusion of labor market flows as determinants in the wage
equation. Like many previous papers, this paper will follow Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (2000) and derive a wage equation from the
assumption that the surplus of a match is shared between the worker and the
employer according to a Nash bargaining game. Millard’s (1997) unemployment
equilibrium model, for example, also follows this tradition and assumes that the
bargaining is carried out in such a way to ensure efficient job destruction, i.e., jobs
are only destroyed when it is in the interest of both the worker and the employer
(see also Millard and Mortensen 1997). A recent extension of this model by Brigden
and Thomas (2003) considers wage formation and the effects of different shocks
on the economy in the United Kingdom, while distinguishing between the search
intensities of non participants and unemployed job seekers.
Search behavior is also the focus of an interesting study by Yashiv (2000). This
study focuses on the process of matching vacancies and unemployed job searchers,
and on the underlying search behavior of employers and workers. Based on the
optimizing behavior of employers and workers, Yashiv estimates the Euler equation
for both groups, derives steady state unemployment, and is able to empirically
assess its main determinants. While Yashiv uses a simultaneous estimation
approach with equations for workers and employers, to focus his analysis on
unemployment and labor market flows, we use a single equation approach to
assess wage formation.1
Instead our analysis is much inspired by Gautier’s (1997) empirical model of
labor market dynamics which uses the Nash bargaining solution to derive a wage
equation in which outflow rates from employment and unemployment and outflow
rates of vacancies determine wages. In doing so we follow the Diamond-Mortensen-
1 The data set used in the Yashiv paper is unique, as it contains information on both wages and
search intensity. Our data, described in the Appendix, lack that information. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 238
Pissarides approach and derive a basic equation for wage formation where
wages are determined as a shared surplus of matches of employers seeking
for workers and workers searching for jobs. In equilibrium, the inflow into
employment and unemployment equals the outflow. We start by writing down
asset values for each of the worker and job states. For simplicity it is assumed
that job destruction is an exogenous process. To avoid clutter we omit the
time index t in this presentation, but note that the denominator of the flow
rates should be lagged one period.
A. Basic search equilibrium wage equation
The asset value of being employed is equal to the wage minus the probability
of becoming unemployed (the lay-off rate) times the associated wealth loss of
becoming unemployed, plus the expected change in the job value or:
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where i represents the discount rate, w is the real wage rate, WE is the asset value
of being employed, WU is the asset value of being unemployed, FEU is the flow of
workers from employment to unemployment and E is the employment stock. The
dot indicates the expected change in the asset value, which is zero in equilibrium.
Similarly, the asset value of being unemployed is given by
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where b is a flat rate unemployment benefit, and U is the unemployment stock. We
ignore other (expected) real returns that the worker might enjoy while unemployed
(cf. Pissarides 2000, p. 13). Along the same lines we can define the asset value of a
filled job, WF. It is equal to the real value added (y) per worker minus wage costs (w)
minus the lay-off rate (FEU/E) times the associated wealth change when the job is
abandoned,
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Finally, the asset value of an unfilled vacancy (WV) is equal to the probability
that it will be filled times the associated change in wealth minus the costs of
forgone output and the costs of posting the vacancy, such as advertisement
costs,
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UE F is the rate at which vacancies are filled up and it is defined by an aggregate
matching function. We assume that the hiring costs (c) are proportional to the real
value added per worker, which equals the value of the vacancy if a worker were to
fill it.
The surplus of a match is shared between the worker and the employer according
to a Nash bargaining game. As in the traditional wage curve models it is assumed
that a generalized Nash bargaining solution formalizes the outcome of the
bargaining process between a representative employee (or union) and a
representative employer (or employers’ organization),
()[] [] . max
1 b b - - - = W V F U E i
w
W W W W w
i
This is similar to the bargaining solution of a traditional wage curve model,
where the worker’s and employer’s threat points represent their utility during a
breakdown in the bargaining process. In the bargaining solution (5) of the
equilibrium search model the threat points WU for workers and WV for employers
represent the present value of (expected) income streams of an unemployed worker
and the present value of the expected profit from a vacant job, respectively. b is a
parameter representing the relative bargaining strength of the worker, or the union.2
It can be shown from the first- and second-order conditions of (5) that any
exogenous variable that increases the threat point present value of the worker’s
income stream or decreases the threat point present value of the employer’s income
stream, raises the wage outcome of the bargaining process. Hence, a higher
replacement rate increases the wage bargaining outcome.
(4)
(5)
2 It is usually assumed that b equals 0.5 but there may be circumstances that justify a different
b, for example when employers and unions have different rates of impatience (Pissarides
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The first order maximization conditions for both the worker and employer
surplus imply () [] [] V F U E W W W W - = - - b b 1 . We can now derive the wage
equation by imposing the condition that in equilibrium all profit opportunities from
new jobs are exhausted and hence the value of a newly opened vacancy is zero,
WV = 0.3 Note that in equilibrium the expected change in the value of a particular
state (unemployed or employed) or job (filled or vacant) is also zero. Following
Pissarides we can derive an expression of the wage by imposing the equilibrium
condition and substituting WE and WF from (1) and (3) into the bargaining solution
(5), to arrive at  () U U iW y iW w - + = b . We substitute (4), the Nash bargaining
solution and the equilibrium condition for vacant jobs, WV = 0, into (2) to arrive at
which we substitute into the previous expression for w to find a convenient
expression for the equilibrium wage rate,4
( ) 1- = b w b
If we assume that all workers find a job by filling a vacancy, so  ,
v
UE UE F F = then
we can rewrite (6) as  () ( ) . 1 1 q b b c y b w + + - = This is the basic aggregate
equilibrium wage equation in Pissarides’ equilibrium search model with q
representing a measure of labor market tightness U/V.
B. Adding taxes, wage related benefits, and non-participants
The wage equation (6) can be refined by including proportional income taxes t
for workers and replacing the flat rate unemployment benefits b by wage related
benefits (represented by the replacement rate rr times the wage rate). Similar to our
derivation of wage equation (6) we can now derive
3 This condition results from the implicit assumption that firms can enter the market without
any restrictions.
4 This equilibrium condition implies that WF = yc / (Fv
UE / V). This also follows directly from (4)




















































































From equation (6) we can see that the equilibrium wage is increasing in y, c and
the flat rate benefit b. Increases in c (the cost of posting a vacancy) and b strengthen
the bargaining position of the workers and as a result the wage will rise. Workers
are likely to bargain over real after-tax wages instead of the nominal wage bill, so
taxes increase wage demands by the worker. Therefore direct taxes and social
premiums paid by workers influence the bargaining outcome. Equation (7)
shows that the equilibrium wage is decreasing in t and increasing in the
replacement rate rr.
In the exposition above we assume that workers can be either employed or
unemployed. In the real world, however, there is a third state, namely workers
outside the labor force. Gautier (1997) derives an equation for wage formation
where wages are determined as a shared surplus of matches in the labor market,
where matches can originate from unemployment as well as from outside the labor
force (non-participants). In equilibrium, inflow and outflow in each of the three
states has to be equal.
Unlike in the model of Brigden and Thomas (2003) it is assumed that persons
outside the labor force have no direct influence on wage formation, so the wage
equation is derived by specifying asset equations for unemployed and employed
workers and for filled and vacant jobs. Non-participants enter the wage formation
process through the inclusion of the quit rate from employment to outside the
labor force (FEN / E) in the asset equation for filled jobs and to include  V F
v
NE / (the
flow rate from out of the labor force to employment) in the asset equation for
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Based on these asset equations, Gautier (1997) then derives the following,
slightly modified, wage equation:5
Although the theoretical foundation of this flow-based wage curve differs
from a traditional wage curve model like, for instance, Oswald (1982), a common
feature is that a bargaining process determines the wage level. The main theoretical
difference is in the way unemployment influences the bargaining outcome. In
traditional wage curve models rising unemployment reduces the union’s bargaining
power, and hence the wage level, because utility is lower for an unemployed worker
than for an employed worker. In search models of the labor market with equilibrium
unemployment the causality runs via the employer’s bargaining power. Rising
unemployment reduces the employer’s search costs because of shorter vacancy
duration and therefore lowers labor turnover costs, which improves the employer’s
threat point in the wage bargaining process. The theoretical wage models presented
here indicate that there are ample grounds for an explorative econometric analysis
of the influence of labor market flows on wage formation.
C. Stylized facts of wage formation in the Netherlands
There appears to be some convergence of evidence in empirical models of
wage formation in the Netherlands (see for example Van de Wijngaert 1994 for a
survey). Increases in consumers plus producers prices are fully passed on to
wages as the elasticity of prices to wages is estimated (or set) equal to unity. In
most models the same applies to labor productivity; in many models there is a unit,
or at least near-unit elasticity between productivity and wages. In other words the
wage space is fully used for wage increases. The wage space is defined as the sum
of price inflation and labor productivity and has played an important role as a
benchmark in wage negotiations in the Netherlands. A recent example of an empirical
study on wage formation in the Netherlands using the wage bargaining model is
5 The wage equation can be derived in a number of ways (Pissarides 2000, p. 16-17). Gautier
chooses to derive the flow version (10), while we choose to derive the aggregate wage equations











































































b b SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM WAGE FORMATION 243
the wage equation included in the JADE-model of the CPB Netherlands Bureau for
Economic Policy Analysis (Central Planning Bureau (CPB) 2003). This equation is
traditional in the sense that unemployment plays (amongst others) a role as
determinant for wage formation in a wage curve specification. The equation
encompasses empirical knowledge on wage formation in the Netherlands. Its focus
is on the tax wedge, and more specifically on the possibilities for employers and
workers to pass on increases in direct taxes and social security contributions to
customers (through higher prices) and employers (through higher wages)
respectively. Like in our empirical model of the next section, the wage equation in
JADE is specified as a cointegration and error correction model. It allows for an
asymmetric influence of the wedge on the short run, whereas the influence of the
wedge on long run wage formation is symmetric although its incidence does not
completely fall on workers.
III. Empirical implementation
The flow variables used in our estimates are defined as rates, where a flow from
x to y is indicated as fxy=FXY /Xt–1. We use the following variables: feu=FEU /Et–1
(flow from employment to unemployment, or the lay-off rate) and fue=FUE /Ut–1 (the
flow from unemployment to employment, or the hiring rate). The flow from
employment to out of the labor force (the quit rate) is defined as fen=FEN /Et–1. It
consists of workers who quit their job due to regular and early retirement and
workers who leave the labor force due to disability. The other two flow variables in
equation (10) relate to persons filling a vacancy:  1 / - = t
v
UE U F fuev is an
unemployed worker filling a vacancy and  1 / - = t
v
NE N F fnev is somebody outside
the labor force filling a vacancy. The flow data that we use for estimation are
constructed using a national accounting method, discussed in the Appendix. The
accounting method and the selection of data sources enables us to include labor
market flows from outside the labor force into employment and unemployment and
it ensures that individuals are not double counted. We choose to use annual flow
data, because the set of quarterly data (see Kock 2002 for a discussion) is only
available for a relatively short sample period, while the annual data cover the
period 1970-1997. The Appendix provides more information on the data and its
construction method.
A. Cointegration equation
We log-linearized equation (10) using a first order Taylor approximation. Given JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 244
the limited number of observations available we use the basic cointegration
approach and the two-step procedure of Engle and Granger (1987) to specify our
empirical model. First the static long-term equilibrium wage level relation is
estimated. In the second step we estimate the associated dynamic error correction
specification. Unit root test results (which are available upon request) indicate
that all variables are I (1) in the observation period.
Table 1. Estimation results of cointegration equation for 1970-1997 sample period
log w = 0.68 log y – 0.77 log (1–t) + 1.08 log rr – 1.28 feu – 5.74 fen – 0.004 (fuev + fnev) –7.28
       (0.027)       (0.238)            (0.094)        (0.484)    (1.566)      (0.001)                 (0.546)
Adjusted R2 = 0.99; ADF = 4.44; PP = 3.83; DW = 1.53; N=26
Notes: ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic on stability of the residuals of the
regression. PP is Phillips-Perron test statistic on stability of the residuals. Critical value at 5
percent significance level is 3.59. DW is the Durbin Watson test statistic. Standard errors are in
parentheses. N is the number of observations. Estimation method: OLS
The estimation results of a static long-term equilibrium wage level relation
based on a linearized version of equation (10) are reported in Table 1. The outflow
out of unemployment turned out not to be significant and was dropped from the
final estimation. A test could not reject equality of the coefficients of the two
variables that represent vacancy outflow due to employment inflow from
unemployment and due to employment inflow from out of the labor force, and
hence these two variables were combined into a single indicator of labor market
tension.
The replacement rate, productivity and tax variables all show the correct sign.
Higher benefits increase the bargaining power of workers, thereby raising the real
wage rate. In fact, the estimated coefficient of 1.08 for the replacement rate suggests
full adjustment of wages to changes in the benefit level in the long run: when
benefits rise with 1 percentage point over wages in the end this leads to an equal
rise in the wage level. Other studies find less then full adjustment; with coefficient
values between 0.17 and 0.33 (see Van de Wijngaert 1994, and the previous
discussion on the JADE-model). Still, we feel that our specification of a long-run
relationship suggests that a constant replacement rate is plausible. It is also
consistent with the long-standing Dutch policy of annually adjusting benefits in
line with the average nominal wage increase in the private sector in the past year. SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM WAGE FORMATION 245
The long run adjustment coefficient for productivity of 0.68 is broadly in line with
the results of other studies, which find coefficients between 0.71 and 1.09.
Apparently workers are able to translate more than two-thirds of the productivity
increases into higher wages, leaving employers and other capital providers with
the remainder. Our estimates seem consistent with the notion that tax cuts support
wage moderation (the estimated coefficient for the tax rate of –0.77 is within the
range of most other studies). Proponents claim that a policy of tax cuts contributed
significantly to employment growth in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s,
often suggesting that the tax cuts were part of a coordinated policy effort by the
government, unions and employers that enabled unions to moderate wage demands.
However, our results also allow for an alternative interpretation, which suggests
that tax cuts stimulated labor supply, which led to lower wage pressure.
Note that our specification of our wage equation is neither a wage curve, nor a
Phillips curve. A wage curve explains the wage level by the level of unemployment,
or similarly, wage growth is explained by the change in unemployment. A Phillips
curve, on the other hand, explains wage growth by the level of unemployment.
Both the wage curve and the Phillips curve can be seen as the outcome of a wage
negotiation process between employers and employees (Blanchflower and Oswald
1990, and Knoester and Van der Windt 1987). Although we also derive our wages
from such a negotiation process, we find instead that the wage level is explained
by labor market flows. In fact these flows are employment inflow from unemployment
and non-participation and employment outflow to unemployment and non-
participation.6 The underlying implication is that it is labor market flows instead of
6 Economic theory is ambiguous as to what the sign of the coefficients of the flows into
employment by filling a vacancy (fuev and fnev) should be. Let’s assume for a moment that U/V
is the proper measure of labor market tightness. In the steady state the relation between labor
market tightness and wages is obvious: any increase in unemployment or decline in vacancies
pushes down wages. From a flow perspective, however, things are not so obvious. When non-
participants fill vacancies, the U/V ratio increases (vacancies decline but U remains unchanged)
and hence we would expect downward wage pressure, although this is somewhat counter intuitive.
When U/V changes because unemployed workers fill vacancies, both the nominator and the
denominator change and the overall effect depends the relative size of U and V. U/V, however,
might not be the proper measure of labor market tightness. A better measure would be, for
example, (U + a N)/V, where a is a coefficient (between zero and 1) that indicates the degree to
which non-participants participate in the labor market. Alternatively a can be seen as a
coefficient of job search intensity. In that case the change in labor market tightness due to
inflow from unemployed workers and non-participants that fill vacancies depends on the initial
number of vacancies and job seekers, as well as the relative weight (or search intensity) of non-
participants (the magnitude of a). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 246
the change or the level of the unemployment rate that determine the bargaining
power of employers and employees. So, our flow-based wage curve is linked to the
traditional wage- and Phillips-curve theories since in all three bargaining between
workers and employers determines the wage outcome. Another link appears when
we focus on the flows into and out of unemployment. With a similar but opposite
effect of these flows on the wage level, the wage level in our model would depend
on the change in unemployment, or, in terms of growth, wage growth would be
explained by the acceleration or deceleration of unemployment growth. It implies
that the specification of our model of wage formation differs from both the wage
curve specification and from the Phillips curve specification.
Our empirical estimates are based on a reduced form single-equation where
wages are determined by the outcome of a Nash bargaining game with respect to
the surplus of the match between workers and employers. In this respect the
theoretical underpinning of our model differs from system-equation methods such
as the model of Millard (1997) and the previously discussed dynamic model by
Yashiv (2000). These models derive theoretical relationships for job destruction
and job creation, and simultaneously estimate wages and labor market flows.
Although theoretically sound, our single-equation approach could potentially
suffer from identification problems. From previous simultaneous equation analysis
for the Netherlands we have learned, however, that simultaneity is unlikely to be a
serious problem. In Broersma and Den Butter (2001) a simple model of the wage-
price spiral is estimated, consisting of equations for wages, prices and labor market
flows. In Broersma and Den Butter (2002) the Johansen simultaneous cointegration
approach is applied to derive three different cointegration relations. One of these
cointegration equations resembles a wage equation and the other two model a
combination of unemployment inflow and outflow. Because these simultaneous
equation estimates did not differ much from single-equation estimates in these
studies we are confident that simultaneity does not distort the estimates in the
present study.7
Does the estimated cointegration equation make sense from an economic
perspective? We think it does. For instance, in case of a recession we observe an
increase in the inflow into unemployment, which in our model reduces the bargaining
7 We also note that in other studies of Philips-curves and wage equations, such as Philips (1958)
and Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), identification and simultaneity were not considered
major problems. Furthermore, the limited number of observations in our dataset, when used to
estimate a simultaneous equation system of wages and labor market flows would lead to
questionable results. SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM WAGE FORMATION 247
power of workers and therefore causes moderate wage growth. In other words,
changes in labor market flows govern wage growth rates instead of changes in (or
levels of) labor market stocks. This paper provides both a theoretical and empirical
underpinning of this insight.
B. Dynamic wage equation
Our theoretical model derived in Section 2 considers a steady state solution of
search equilibrium in the labor market. However in reality there are adjustment
lags. Therefore, in our empirical analysis we allow for these adjustment lags and
use the cointegration approach to estimate the dynamic wage equation in error
correction form (Table 2). We prefer to specify the non-flow indicators in logs to
establish a relation between the percentage change in the real wage rate and the
percentage change in productivity, taxes and the replacement rate (cf. Graafland
1990a and 1990b). The indicators of labor market tension are specified as first
differences of flow rates. Our specification approach is to move from a general to
a specific model. The general model specification includes contemporaneous and
lagged dynamic variables and the error correction term from the model in Table 1.
Table 2. Estimation results of dynamic wage equation for 1970-1997 sample period
Dlog w = .95Dlog y – .73Dlog(1–t) + .73Dlog rr – 1.48D feu–1 – 4.01D fen–1 – .003D (fuev–1 + fnev–1) –.65 err–1 – .006
      (0.141)     (0.241)          (0.100)        (0.538)        (1.260)        (0.001)                   (0.189)      (0.003)
Adjusted R2 = 0.83; SSR = 0.001; SE = 0.008; DW = 2.13; N=25
Notes: SSR is the sum of squared residuals and SE is the standard error of regression. DW is the
Durbin Watson test statistic. err is the derived residual from the cointegration equation. Standard
errors are in parentheses. N is the number of observations. Estimation method: OLS.
Our estimation results suggest an almost instant adjustment of wages to
changes in productivity, possibly because workers are successfully forward looking
with respect to productivity changes and take this into account when negotiating
nominal wages. Policy changes might be more difficult to predict, which would
explain why wage adjustments in response to changes in the tax rate and the
replacement rate take somewhat longer, although with a coefficient of 0.73 the
short run adjustment elasticities are still quite high. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 248
The lay-off rate (feu) and the flow of workers who leave the labor force (fen)
push the wage rate down. The results that we find for the lay-off rate are comparable
with other studies for the Netherlands, with long run coefficients between –1.20
and –2.01 (see Van de Wijngaert 1994). The negative impact of fen on wages is
notable. From a theoretical point of view, the impact of labor market outflow on
wages can be positive or negative, depending on whether the stochastic or
endogenous component in this flow dominates. On the one hand, the stochastic
component relates to workers who leave employment due to regular retirement or
disability. This outflow from employment reduces labor supply and hence wages
increase. On the other hand, the endogenous component relates to workers who
leave the labor force by choice-either their own or their employer’s-mainly because
weak economic conditions encourage them to retire early, rather than face the
prospect of unemployment. These separations from employment are associated
with declining wages.8 This type of outflow to non-participation reduces workers’
bargaining power and hence wages decline for the same reason that lay-offs cause
lower wages.
The results suggest that in our sample the flow from employment to non-
participation is dominated by the choice component. In fact, the wage impact of
the flow out of the labor force is bigger than the impact of the lay-off rate. The
former flow has rarely been used in an empirical study, as far as we know.9 A
plausible explanation would be that the average wage rate is lower for workers that
are being laid-off than for workers leaving the labor force for early-retirement or
other non-participation because workers in the later group are most likely older
and are more unionized. Another way to see this is to consider the impact of
different outflow rates for these two groups over the business cycle. In a boom the
lay-off rate will decrease more than the separation rate to non-participation, because
8 Frijters and Van der Klaauw (2003) estimate an empirical job search model with a similar
mechanism. In their microeconomic model unemployed job seekers leave the labor force (a
flow from unemployment to non-participation) when their reservation wage falls below their
utility from non-participation. This mechanism illustrates that the large negative coefficient
that we find for flows from employment to outside the labor force (fen) could in part involve
reverse causality. On the other hand, to the extent that non-participants are part of effective
labor supply, an increase in fen could very well push down wages (see also footnote 6).
9 An exception is the study of Brigden and Thomas (2003). However, in their model it is
impossible to write down a single reduced form equation linking movements in the stock of
unemployed workers or non-participants to wage pressure. That is because the relationship
between job seekers and wage pressure depends on the source of the shock that caused the
unemployment rate or the inactivity rate to move. SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM WAGE FORMATION 249
most people will make their retirement decision independent of the business cycle.
Faced with a smaller stock of unemployed workers to hire from, employers are then
forced to hire more expensive non-participants, pushing up the wage rate even
further. In a recession the more or less constant outflow of relatively expensive
workers to non-participation reinforces the downward wage pressure, which is a
result of lay-offs.
The impact of the flow of filled vacancies turns out surprisingly small. The
error correction term in the dynamic wage equation is significant and indicates that
current wages are corrected for past errors. The coefficient of 0.65 indicates that
short run (partial) adjustment is quite fast, although in the JADE model a coefficient
value of 0.85 was found which suggest that wages approach their long run levels
even more quickly.
IV. Conclusion
This paper empirically investigates the influence of labor market dynamics on
wage formation. The traditional literature models wage formation either as a Phillips
curve (where the unemployment rate is a determinant of the change in the wage
rate) or a wage curve (where the unemployment rate is a determinant of the wage
level). Our specification of the wage curve implies a third possible long-term
relationship between wages and economic variables: the wage level is a function
of labor market flows and other explanatory variables. In fact, we use the change in
the unemployment rate as an explanatory variable in the wage curve, since flows in
and out of unemployment determine the change in the level of unemployment in
each period.
We find that labor market flows are suitable substitutes for traditional indicators
of labor market tightness and hence qualify for inclusion into the wage equation.
More specifically, we find that a combination of the outflow from employment to
unemployment (layoffs), the outflow from employment to non-participation, and
the outflow of vacancies (successful matches) determine the wage level. This
corresponds with the theoretical foundation of the wage equation, which describes
wage formation as the outcome of a bargaining game between employers and
employees, in which the relative bargaining power depends on labor market
tightness. Our results support the notion that, especially in the context of equilib-
rium search theory, labor market flows are relevant for the outcome of the wage-
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Appendix: Data sources and definitions
The non-flow data were obtained from the national accounts of Statistics
Netherlands (CBS) and the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
(CPB). We use annual data and the sample period is 1970 – 97: w is real wage rate
of workers in enterprises (source: CPB); y is value added per worker, market sector
only (source: CPB); rr is replacement rate, weighted average of welfare and
unemployment insurance benefits (source: CPB); t is direct taxes on wage income
(transaction based) (source: CPB).
The flow data used in this paper were constructed using a national accounting
system for labor market flows, which is discussed in detail in Broersma, Den Butter,
and Kock (2000) and Kock (2002). Those papers also provide a sensitivity analysis
of the construction method and compare the results with other studies and data
sources. Below is a summary of the national accounting system, which is
constructed in three steps.
Step 1: Primary sources. We identify and collect data on the stocks and flows
that are available from primary sources. The entire national accounting system
generates 27 labor market flows (eighteen worker flows and nine job flows) and 6
stocks: Employed (E), Unemployed (U), workers outside the labor force or
Non-participants (N) and Vacancies (V). Non-participation includes everyone
above age 14 who is not part of the labor force and is defined as the sum of
disabled workers (ND) and a residual category labeled other non-participants (NO),
which includes retired workers and students, among others. Unemployed
workers receive unemployment insurance benefits (UI) or welfare (UW). We
disregard part-time employment because our accounting system does not allow
individuals to be included in more than one group at a time. The flows of workers
are indicated by the general symbol  ,
z
xy F which denotes the flow from x to y,
}, , , , , { ) , ( O D I W N N E U U y x =  with, when relevant, z = j in case of newly created
jobs, z = v in case of jobs for which a vacancy existed, and z is omitted if no job flow
is involved.
All stocks of persons and vacancies and nine flows (the total inflow of new
vacancies and eight worker flows) are available from primary sources, albeit that
we sometimes have to combine different sources. It appears that flow data are
available for employment outflow (to unemployment insurance, occupational
disability and other non-participation) and for the flow out of unemployment
insurance provisions (to employment and non-participation).
Step 2: Assumptions.The second step is to make additional assumptions to SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM WAGE FORMATION 251
close the accounting system. It turned out that we have to make twelve assumptions,
of which some are related. All parameters in the assumptions are based on micro-
economic evidence and panel data surveys that are discussed in Kock (2002). We
apply the following fixed assumptions for worker flows:
(recovery) ) 65 ( 55 . 0 D D N N N N F
O D * + = +
(recovery) 20 . 0 D U N N F
W D * =
The first assumption specifies that the share of workers receiving disability
benefits who leave the labor market depends on the number of benefit recipients
that reach the retirement age of 65 and the number of benefit recipients that recover
from disability. According to the second assumption a proportion of disabled
workers that recover qualify for unemployment benefits. Assumptions A3 and A4
specify the flows between welfare recipients and non-participation. The inflow
into welfare depends on the number of graduating students, while the reverse flow
is assumed to be a share of total outflow from welfare.
As regards job flows, we distinguish between job searchers filling a vacancy
(e.g.  v
UE F ) and job searchers who take up a job for which no vacancy existed (e.g.
j
UE F ). As there is no information on the relative importance of the two types of
flows into employment, we have to make assumptions on one of them. We assume
that the inflow into employment without filling a vacancy is a fraction of the total
flow into employment. This fraction x is the share of total hires which do not lead
to an outflow of vacancies in a particular year,  ( ) , H VO H f - = x where H is the
number of hires and VOf  is the number of filled vacancies. We get
, EE
j
EE F F x = , UE
j
UE F F x = and  . NE
j
NE F F x = In order to determine the fraction
x we need information on the number of filled vacancies, which together with the
number of scrapped vacancies determines the total outflow of vacancies. We
assume that the number of scrapped vacancies is a function of the stock of
vacancies;  . V * 0.30 = VOs Note that unlike the worker flow assumptions, the




) schoolout ( * 50 . 0 O U N N F
W O = (A3)
O U F W N U O W * = 4 . 0 (A4) JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 252
Step 3: Equations. We use the stock and flow information gathered in the
previous steps to derive the resulting flows by means of definition equations and
stock-flow equations. Definition equations refer to job and worker flows that are
linked, such as employment inflow by means of filling a vacancy and vacancy
outflow. Stock-flow equations are used to derive the remaining flows, based on a
simple accounting rule that indicates that the change in a stock equals inflow
minus outflow, all measured over the unit period of observation.
Using assumptions A1 and A2 we can derive the flow of occupational disabled
who find a job as follows:  .
W D O D D D O D U N N N D EN N N E N F F N F F F - - D - + =
Using assumptions  A2, A3, and A4 we can derive the inflow into
employment from welfare,   .
O W W N U W E U F O U F - = Finally, we derive the
inflow into the labor force of non-participants who find a job from
, E N E U E U E N D I W O F F F EI F - - - =  where  EI is the total inflow into employment,
defined as  , E F F F F E EO EI EM EN EN EU O D I D + + + + = D + = with EM F
representing worker mortality.
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